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Hoops: Retroactivity, Implied Waiver, and the FSIA: Is it Time to Reform

COMMENT
RETROACTIVITY, IMPLIED WAIVER, AND THE
FSIA: IS IT TIME TO REFORM THE LAW ON
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY?
[I]fit appears that [agents of a sovereign breachedinternationallaw]
by order of the sovereign, such a proceeding in a foreign sovereign is
justly considered as an injury, and as a sufficient causefor declaring
war against him, unless he condescends to make suitable reparation.
-United States Supreme Court Chief Justice John Jay.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1942, some three months after the United States formally
declared war against Nazi Germany, Hugo Princz, an American Jew, was
living with his parents, sister, and two younger brothers in what is now
Slovakia.2 Presumably because they were Jewish, the Princz family was
arrested by the Slovak Fascist police and subsequently turned over to the
German SS, whereupon they were sent to Camp Maidanek in Poland.3
Although most American citizens captured by the Nazis were released to
the International Red Cross in a prisoner exchange program, again,
because they were Jews, the Princz family was not.4 Instead, the Princz
family was torn asunder. Mr. Princz's parents and sister were sent to
Treblinka, where they were subsequently murdered, while Mr. Princz and
his brothers were sent to Auschwitz, and later Birkenau, where they were

1. Henfield's Case, I1 F. Cas. 1099, 1104 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).
2. Prinez v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp. 22,23 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd,26 F.3d
1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995). Mr. Princz's father was a naturalized
American citizen conducting business affairs in what was then known as Czechoslovakia.
3. Id.

4. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 923 (1995).
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forced into slave labor at an I.G. Farben chemical plant.' After incurring
work-related injuries at the plant, Mr. Princz's brothers were committed
to a Birkenau "hospital," where Mr. Princz endured the horror of
witnessing their deaths by starvation.6
Sometime after his brothers' deaths, Mr. Princz was sent to the
Warsaw Ghetto where, in his own words, he had an eight month "relative
respite" from the atrocities witnessed by and inflicted upon him.7 That
respite ended in October of 1944, when Mr. Princz was forced on a death
march to Dachau and "enslaved as a laborer" in an underground
Messerschmidt factory.' Six months later, as he was being prepared to
be transferred yet again, Mr. Princz was liberated by U.S. troops from a
packed cattle train destined for the Alps, where he and his fellow
prisoners were to be subjected to a mass execution as part of the Nazis'
attempt to destroy all evidence of the Holocaust. 9 While the other
liberated prisoners were sent to displaced persons camps, because he was
an American citizen Mr. Princz was instead sent to an American military
hospital.' °
Seven years after World War II came to an end, the government of
what is now the Federal Republic of Germany established a reparations
program which was to provide pensions for Holocaust survivors." In
1955, Mr. Princz filed a claim with the United Restitution Office
("URO"), which handled pension fund disbursements, only to be told that
he was ineligible for a pension because he was an American citizen at
the time of his enslavement.' In 1965, when the URO amended the
pension law, he failed to file a second claim.' 3 According to Mr. Princz,
the amended law did not enlarge the pool of claimants, but, rather, only
extended through 1969 the period of time in which already eligible
Holocaust survivors could file a claim. 4

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id. at 1176 (Wald, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1177.
Id.
Id.

10. Id.
at1168.
11. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp. 22,24 (D.D.C. 1992), reid,26 F.3d
1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995).
12. Id. That after the war Mr. Princz was not a "refugee" within the meaning of the Geneva
Convention served as an additional reason for the URO to deny his claim. See Princz, 26 F.3d at

1168.
13. Princz, 813 F. Supp. at 24.

14. Id. It should be noted that Mr. Princz apparently did not raise this argument at the time
the pension law was amended. Instead, the argument appears to have been raised only after Mr.
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After all subsequent attempts by Mr. Prinez to obtain reparations 5
proved fruitless, in 1992 he resorted to filing an action against Germany
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.' 6 In
response to Mr. Princz's action, Germany filed a motion to dismiss,
claiming that it was entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA"), and was thus not subject to the district
court's jurisdiction. 7 The district court denied Germany's motion,
however, asserting that the FSIA had no role to play under the facts of
the case. 8
Two years later, a divided United States Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit reversed the district court and dismissed Mr. Princz's
claim. 9 The court found that, in light of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,20 if the
FSIA did govern the case, then none of its exceptions were applicable.2'
As such, the FSIA would bar Mr. Princz's action, as the district court
would lack jurisdiction over the matter.22 Alternatively, if the FSIA did
not govern, the district court would nonetheless be barred from hearing

Princz filed his claim against Germany in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. Id. In response, Germany claimed that the amended law did in fact enlarge the pool of
eligible applicants. Id. at 24 n. 1. However, as there is no record of any real deliberation by either
the district court or the court of appeals on this issue (indeed, the court of appeals fails to mention
it entirely), it shall not be the subject of further discussion in this Comment.
15. After 1969, The Federal Republic of Germany set up a $1.2 billion hardship fund for
Holocaust survivors who, for excusable reasons, had failed to file a timely application for a pension
under previous laws. The German government controls neither eligibility determinations nor
disbursement of the fund, which is instead administered by the Jewish Claims Commission in New
York. Mr. Princz applied for payment from this fund, but was advised that the fund was being
reserved for genuine hardship cases and that he therefore did not qualify because he was able to
work as a grocery clerk and his wife worked as a bookkeeper. Id. at 24.
In 1984, Mr. Princz enlisted the aid of Senator Bill Bradley and the U.S. Department of State
to obtain ex gratia reparation payments from the German government. These requests were denied,
as were requests made through diplomatic channels by both the Bush and Clinton administrations.
Finally, Mr. Princz's situation was presented to the German Supreme Court, which held that
the 1969 statute of limitations for filing a pension claim was final. Id.
16. Id. at 22. Mr. Princz's specific claims against Germany were for false imprisonment,
assault and battery, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and recovery in
quantum meruit for the value of the labor he performed in the I.G. Farben and Messerschmidt
factories. Princz,26 F.3d at 1168.
17. Princz, 813 F. Supp. at 22.
18. Id. at 26.
19. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1166.
20. 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (holding that the FSIA provided the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state).
21. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1175.
22. Id. at 1176.
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the case, as no alternative means of obtaining jurisdiction would be
available to it.23 However, in a persuasive dissenting opinion, Judge
Patricia Wald found that: (1) the FSIA applied; (2) it should be given
retroactive effect to cover Mr. Princz's claims; and, (3) Germany
impliedly waived its right to a claim of sovereign immunity by violating
a variety of norms of international law during World War 11.24
This Comment criticizes a portion of the underlying reasoning of the
D.C. Circuit's opinion in Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany,25 and
seeks to preserve, in a slightly modified form, the rule enunciated by
Judge Patricia Wald in her dissenting opinion. Specifically, this Comment
argues that, at least where facts as extraordinary as those in Mr. Princz's
case exist, a foreign state that violates certain fundamental norms of
international law impliedly waives its claim of immunity from the
jurisdiction of U.S courts.26 It also argues that despite considerable
precedent to the contrary,27 in light of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Landgrafv. USI Film Products,28 the FSIA should henceforth be given retroactive application.29
Part II of this Comment first explores the purpose of and historical
background of the FSIA. It then turns to the FSIA's implied waiver
exception, embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1), and, finally, to the
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1602 as it relates to applying the FSIA
retroactively. Part III begins with a general discussion of international
law and how it is applied in U.S. courts. It next seeks to provide the
reader with a general overview of the different fundamental norms of
international law and the effect given to them by the international
community. Part IV discusses in greater detail the opinions of the district

23. Id. For a discussion of those alternative means and the court's underlying reasoning for
rejecting them, see infra text accompanying notes 105-08.
24. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1176-85 (Wald, J., dissenting). Judge Wald argued that, contrary to the
majority's opinion, there was an applicable exception to FSIA immunity, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)
(1994), the FSIA's implied waiver exception. Id. at 1179.
25. 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995). I use the term "portion
of" because this Comment is only concerned with the reasoning that led the majority of the court
to reject Mr. Prinez's argument that Germany impliedly waived its immunity from the jurisdiction
of U.S. courts when it violated certain norms of international law during World War II. Mr. Princz
also argued that his claim fell within both the commercial activity and existing treaty exceptions to
the FSIA, but the reasoning behind the court's rejection of these arguments appears to be sound.

26. Intemational law recognizes a group of fundamental norms, known as jus cogens or
peremptory norms, from which no derogation is permitted. See infra part III.C.
27. See infra notes 52-53, 55-57 and accompanying text.
28. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
29. See infra part V.A.
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court and the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
Finally, Part V presents the arguments for applying the FSIA retroactively, and, in cases which present facts similar to those of Mr. Prinez's case,
for denying a foreign state immunity under the FSIA when such a state
violates certain norms of international law known as Jus cogens norms.
II.

THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976
A.

HistoricalBackground and Purpose

For most of its short history, the United States has embraced the
concept first enunciated by Chief Justice John Marshall in The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon" that, absent consent, a foreign state is entitled
to absolute sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.3'
Writing for the Court, Marshall declared the world to be "composed of
distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights and equal independence ....32 As such, states enjoyed full and absolute jurisdiction
within their own territories which, however, did "not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights ....A foreign
sovereign [could not be] understood as intending to subject himself to a
jurisdiction incompatible with his dignity, and the dignity of his
nation .... .""
Nonetheless, the concept of foreign sovereign immunity envisioned
in The Schooner Exchange was, and continues to be, "a matter of grace
and comity on the part of the United States, and not a restriction imposed
by the Constitution.,, 34 Accordingly, for well into the twentieth century
it had been the practice of U.S. courts to defer to the discretion of the
Executive Branch on whether to exercise jurisdiction over foreign
states.35 The beginning of the end of this practice was signaled in 1952
by the famous letter from the State Department's Acting Legal Adviser,

30. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
3 . See Adam C. Belsky et al., Comment, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed
Exception to Immunity for Violations of PeremptoryNorms ofInternationalLaw, 77 CAL. L. REV.
365, 379 (1989).
32. 11US. at 136.
33. Id. at 137.
34. Verlinden B.V.v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
35. Id. at 486 (citing Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 33-36 (1945); Exparte
Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586-90 (1943)).
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Jack Tate, to the Acting Attorney General, Philip B. Perlman ("Tate
Letter").36
When The Schooner Exchange was decided, the actions of states
were almost exclusively political and governmental, with their most
important functions "'limited more or less ... to problems of internal
administration or to the pursuit of diplomatic and military objectives. '
However, the twentieth century brought changes in the roles of states as
they increasingly entered into commercial relationships with private
s
parties and, as a result, often became entangled in litigation.
The Tate Letter recognized this problem and, as a solution, adopted
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity under which a foreign
sovereign would retain its immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
with regard to traditional sovereign or public acts of state, but relinquish
immunity with regard to its private acts.39 Still, the courts continued to
defer to the Executive Branch on whether to exercise jurisdiction over
foreign states41until 1976, when Congress codified the restrictive theory 0
in the FSIA.
While a complete analysis of the FSIA is beyond the scope of this
Comment, the Act's chief purpose is to leave the determination of
whether to exercise jurisdiction over foreign states exclusively to the
courts.42 To achieve this goal, the FSIA provides "a comprehensive set
of legal standards governing claims of immunity in every civil action
against a foreign state or its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities."43 In general, the FSIA extends immunity to foreign states

36. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Phillip B.
Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 app. 2 (1976) [hereinafter Tate Letter].
37. See Belsky et al., supra note 31, at 379 (alteration in original) (quoting THEODORE R.
GiuTTARi, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SovEREiGN IMMUNrrY 3 (1970)).
38. Belsky et al., supra note 31, at 379.
39. See Tate Letter, supra note 36, at 714 ("IT]he widespread and increasing practice on the
part of governments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice which will
enable persons doing business with them to have their rights determined in the courts.").
40. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487-88 (1983).
41. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1602-11 (1994).

42. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604-06.
43. Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 488. The governing provisions of the FSIA are §§ 1604 and
1330(a), which work in tandem. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428, 434 (1989). Section 1604 provides that

[s]ubject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the
time of enactment of this Act[,] a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to
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from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts subject to certain enumerated
exceptions." Stated broadly, these exceptions include: (1) cases in
which a foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or
implicitly; (2) actions against a foreign state based upon: (i) a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; (ii) an
act performed in the United States connected with a commercial activity
of the foreign state occurring outside of the United States; or (iii) an act
outside the United States connected with a commercial activity of the
foreign state which also occurs outside the United States, but which has
a direct effect in the United States; (3) cases in which rights in property
taken in violation of international law are at issue; (4) cases in which
rights in property in the United States acquired by succession or gift, or
rights in immovable property situated in the United States are at issue;
(5) actions against a foreign state seeking monetary damages in compensation for personal injury or death, or damage or loss of property,
occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission
of the foreign state or of its agents while acting within their official
capacity; and, (6) actions against a foreign state brought to enforce an
agreement made by the foreign state with or for the benefit of, a private
party." For the purpose of this Comment, the implied waiver exception
is most relevant and is discussed more extensively below.
B.

The FSI " Implied Waiver Exception

Unsurprisingly, the FSIA does not extend sovereign immunity to a
foreign state which has waived such immunity.4 6 For obvious reasons,
the question of whether a foreign state has explicitly waived its claim of
sovereign immunity has never been the subject of judicial scrutiny. The

1607 of this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994). Section 1330(a) provides for subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign
state, stating that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state ... as to any claim for relief in

personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity[,J either under
sections 1605-1607 of this title ... or under any applicable international agreement." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1330(a) (1994). Finally, section 1330(b) provides that "[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state
shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under
subsection (a) .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1994).
44. See supra note 43.

45. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1994). "A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction
of courts of the United States or of the States in any case ... in which the foreign state has waived
its immunity either explicitly or by implication .
I...
Id. (emphasis added).
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question of whether a foreign state has impliedly waived its sovereign

immunity, however, can be, and has been, the source of considerable
debate.47 Most courts that have been presented with the argument that a
foreign state has impliedly waived its claim of sovereign immunity have
construed the FSIA's implied waiver exception narrowly, and have
generally declined to stray beyond Congress's list of examples of implied
waiver in the Act's legislative history.48 These examples include: (1)

cases in which foreign states agree to arbitration in the United States; (2)
cases in which foreign states agree that the law of the United States

should govern; and, (3) cases in which a foreign state has filed a
responsive pleading in an action without raising the defense of sovereign
immunity.49 Additionally, courts have usually required some evidence

that the foreign state intended to waive its immunity under the FSIA
before they will find that the foreign state has impliedly done so.5 As
shall be seen, however, at least one court apparently did not feel bound
by such precedential constraints."
C. Retroactive Application of the FSIA

Retroactive application of the FSIA has almost always been
disfavored by courts that have been presented with the issue. 2 These

47. See Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. v. Committee of Receivers for A.W. Galadari,
12 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1644 (1994); Siderman de Blake v. Republic
of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993); Joseph v. Office
of Consulate Gen., 830 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988); Frolova v.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985); Maritime Int'l Nominees
Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815
(1983).
48. See, e.g., Frolova,761 F.2d at 377 (holding that the U.S.S.R. did not impliedly waive its
sovereign immunity when it signed the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Accords).
49. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604.
50. See Frolova, 761 F.2d at 377; accord Drexel Burnham, 12 F.3d at 326;
Foremost-McKesson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Maritime Int 7,
693 F.2d at 1100 n.10.
51. See Siderman, 965 F.2d at 720 (holding that Argentina impliedly waived its sovereign
immunity when it availed itself of the use of U.S. courts in pursuit of the plaintiff). For a full
discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 152-69.
52. See Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 841 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988) (holding that the FSIA did not confer jurisdiction over action on
claims arising before the State Department issued the Tate Letter in 1952); Jackson v. People's
Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490 (1lth Cir. 1986) (holding that the FSIA does not apply
retroactively to confer subject matter jurisdiction over events which occurred in 1911); Slade v.
United States of Mexico, 617 F. Supp. 351 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 790 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987) (holding that the FSIA does not apply retroactively to allow
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courts have followed the general rule of statutory construction that a
statute which interferes with or regulates human action shall not be given
retroactive application, unless such is "'the unequivocal and inflexible
import of [the statute's] terms, and the manifest intention of the
legislature"' 5 3 As Judge Patricia Wald has noted, however, "[t]he
language and legislative history of the FSIA provide only ambiguous
guidance on the retroactivity question."54 Nonetheless, courts that have
declined to apply the FSIA retroactively have seized upon both the
"henceforth" language of section 1602, 5' and Congress's decision to
forestall the effective date of the FSIA until ninety days after it became
law,56 as evidence that the Act's reach was intended to be solely
prospective in nature." It should be noted, however, that all of the
decisions denying retroactive application to the FSIA were reached
without the aid of the Supreme Court's teaching in Landgrafv.USI Film
Products,58 which may dictate a different interpretation of the issuer 9

plaintiff to recover debt arising from agreements made in 1922).
There is at least one decision favoring retroactive application of the FSIA. See
Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that the
FSIA, which merely codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity adopted in 1952, applies
retroactively to events occurring before its enactment). However, this case has been impliedly
overruled by the Carl Marks decision. See Carl Marks & Co., 841 F.2d at 26.
53. Union Pacific R.R. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913) (quoting United
States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 413 (1806)). These courts theorize that applying the FSIA to
events which occurred before the Tate Letter adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
in 1952 would upset a foreign state's expectation that it was entitled to absolute immunity from the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts under the law as it then stood. See CarlMarks & Co., 841 F.2d at 26.
54. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995). For a full discussion of Judge Wald's dissenting
opinion, see infra part IV.C.
55. "Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United
States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter." 28 U.S.C. § 1602
(1994) (emphasis added).
56. H.R. REP. No. 1487,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.
57. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1178 (citing Slade v. United States of Mexico, 617 F. Supp. 351, 357
(D.D.C. 1985)).
58. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
59. See infra part V.A.
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III.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS PLACE IN U.S. COURTS

A.

The U.S. Approach to InternationalLaw

While it is well established that international law constitutes a part
of United States law,6° the problem of exactly what application is to be
given to international law in U.S. courts is often a perplexing one, and
largely depends on the type of international law a claimant wishes a
court to apply.6' Generally, countries have adopted one of two different
approaches to the application of international law in their courts.62
Those countries adopting the so-called "monist" approach, such as
Austria, give international law a status equal to, or supreme over,
domestic law.63 At the other extreme, countries which have adopted the
so-called "dualist" approach, such as the United Kingdom, will not
enforce international law in their courts absent some type of implementing legislation.'
United States law is viewed by some commentators as incorporating
characteristics of both approaches.65 For example, it is well settled that
"where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act
or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations." 66 However, it has also long been the law in the
United States that the existence of an applicable treaty, statute, or
constitutional provision trumps a recognized custom of international
law.67 It would appear then that, at least insofar as the concern is
60. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that "[ilnternational law is part
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction . . ."). Indeed, the United States Constitution recognizes this proposition by investing
Congress with the power to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, U.S. CONST. art
I, § 8, cl.10, and declaring that any treaty entered into under the authority of the United States
becomes part of the supreme law of the land. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
61. See generally Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859
F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
62. See FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID wEISsBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW,
POLICY, AND PROCESS 554 (1990).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 555.
65. Id. at 554 (citing Reagan, 859 F.2d at 937); cf I RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 40-42 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
66. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
67. Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960); see
also Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) ("[A]s concem[s] domestic law ...subsequently enacted statutes ... preempt existing
principles of customary international law-just as they displace[] prior inconsistent treaties.").
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whether or not to apply the customary law of nations, U.S. courts are
somewhat constrained in their application of international law. Whether

this would also be the case if a U.S. court were called upon to apply a
jus cogens norm68 of international law is unclear.69
B.

Customary InternationalLaw

Customary norms of international law reflect practices which have
been widely accepted by the international community out of a sense of
legal obligation.7" Courts make the determination of what is and what

is not customary international law by looking to international conventions
and treaties, the customs and practices of nations, the works of jurists
and commentators, and both domestic and international law decisions.7
Norms of international law can generally be divided into two
categories: jus dispositivum and jus cogens.7 z A jus dispositvum norm
is binding upon only those governments that have consented to be bound
thereby.73 Thus, a government which has consistently objected to the
development of a jus dispositivum norm will not be bound by it.74
Governments may also alter ajus dispositivum norm by either encouraging other states to violate it,75 or by enacting a conflicting statute
subsequent to the norm's development.7 6

68. For an explanation of the jus cogens concept, see infra part III.C.
69. See, e.g., Reagan, 859 F.2d at 940 (discussing but ultimately reaching no decision on
whether or not jus cogens norms of international law operate domestically); see also part V.B.
70. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 102(2); see also David F. Klein, A Theory for the
Application of the Customary InternationalLaw of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J.
INT'L L. 332 (1988).
71. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700-01 (1900); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. Klein, supra note 70, at 350-53.
73. Id. at 351. At least where the United States is concerned, however, this proposition must
be qualified. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
For example, as a member of the United Nations, the United States has agreed to be bound
by any judgment of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") to which it is a party. See U.N.
CHARTER, art. 94, I. As such, in Reagan, plaintiffs sought to enforce a 1986 decision by the ICJ
ordering the United States government to cease its funding of the Contras. Regan, 859 F.2d at 929.
Recognizing that the United States' contravention of an ICJ judgment may indeed violate customary
international law, the D.C. Circuit nonetheless dismissed plaintiffs' claims, holding that the
legislation enacted by Congress to fund the Contras preempted the United States' obligations under
Article 94 of the U.N. Charter. Id. at 934, 937.
74. RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 102 emt. d.
75. Klein, supra note 70, at 351.
76. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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C. Jus Cogens Norms of InternationalLaw

Jus cogens norms of international law, also known as peremptory
norms, "enjoy the highest status in international law and prevail over
both customary international law and treaties. 77 Courts use the same
means of ascertaining whether a norm has attained the status of jus
cogens as they use to determine customary international law. 71 Unlike
customary international law, however, for a norm to attain the status of

jus cogens it must be recognized and accepted by the international
community as a whole. 9 Additionally, jus cogens norms are binding
upon all nations, regardless of consent, and can only be modified or
preempted "by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character."'
Although the concept ofjus cogens is now widely accepted,81 there
are sometimes disagreements on its exact content. 82 Still, with some
norms of international law, there is little question as to theirjus cogens
status. For example, there is general agreement that the principles
underlying the U.N. Charter's prohibition of the use of force are jus
cogens8 3 It is also agreed that certain human rights law, such as the
prohibitions of slavery, murder, genocide, torture, racial discrimination,
and prolonged arbitrary detention, has achieved jus cogens status."
During World War II, Nazi Germany was guilty of all of the aforementioned human rights relatedjus cogens violations. 85

77. Reagan, 859 F.2d at 935; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 102 cmt. k
(international agreements violatingjus cogens are void).
78. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995). For a listing of the means in question, see supra text
accompanying note 71.
79. RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 102 cmt. k & reporter's note 6. As has been previously
discussed, a norm need only be widely accepted in the international community to attain the status
of customary international law. See supra text accompanying note 70.
80. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332.
81. See generally Princz, 26 F.3d at 1166; Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993); Reagan, 859 F.2d at 929.
82. See, e.g., Reagan, 859 F.2d at 935-36, 940 (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that an ICJ
judgment is a binding, jus cogens norm of international law).
83. RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 102 cmt. k.
84. Id. § 702 cmt. n.
85. See Princz, 26 F.3d at 1182 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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IV. PRINCZ V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
A.

The District Court's Opinion

In 1992, Hugo Princz, an American citizen and Holocaust survivor,
brought action in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia against the Federal Republic of Germany seeking long denied
reparation payments.86 The only issue before the court at the time of its
opinion was whether it had subject matter jurisdiction over Germany to
hear Mr. Princz's case. 7 Germany argued that it did not, and filed a
motion to dismiss Mr. Princz's claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1330, the
governing provision of the FSIA.88 Specifically, Germany argued that
as Mr. Princz's claim fit within none of the FSIA's exceptions, it was
entitled to the broad immunity which Congress otherwise extended to
foreign states when it enacted the FSIA."9
In denying Germany's motion to dismiss,9" the court considered,
but ultimately declined to apply, the teaching of the Supreme Court's
decision in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,9
which held that the FSIA provided "the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state."'92 It noted that the Supreme Court did
not have such facts as those presented in Mr. Princz's case before it
when it rendered its decision in Hess, and concluded that neither Hess
nor the FSIA itself barred the court from hearing Mr. Princz's claim. 93
Finally, the court found that the U.S. courts were the only available
forum in which Mr. Princz could bring his claim, 94 and held that, as an
American citizen, Mr. Princz had "a constitutional right to proceed in a
United States Court" against Germany. 95

86. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp. 22,23-25 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd,26
F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995); see also part V.B.
87. Id. at 25.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
92. Id. at 434.
93. Princz, 813 F. Supp. at 26 ("A government which stands in the shoes of a rogue nation
the likes of Nazi Germany is estopped from asserting U.S. law in this fashion.").
94. An administrative determination by the German Supreme Court indicated that Mr. Princz's
claim would have been denied had he presented it there, and Mr. Princz asserted that no foreign
national had ever successfully brought a case such as his in Germany. Id.
95. Id. at 27.
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B.

The D.C. Circuit' Opinion

The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found the
district court's denial of Germany's motion to dismiss to be immediately
appealable.96 Shortly thereafter, it reversed the judgment of the district
court and dismissed Mr. Princz's case.97 In reaching its decision, the
court considered the arguments raised by Mr. Princz that: (1) Germany
impliedly waived its immunity under the FSIA when it violated jus
cogens norms of international law during World War II; and (2) the
FSIA should be given retroactive application to cover the events in
question.98 It also considered two arguments raised by Germany in
response: (1) the FSIA provides the sole basis for a U.S. court to obtain
jurisdiction over a foreign state, and thus, as Mr. Princz's claim falls
within none of the FSIA's exceptions, the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction; and, alternatively, (2) the FSIA does not apply
retroactively, therefore entitling Germany to absolute sovereign immunity
under the law of the D.C. Circuit as it stood at the time Mr. Princz was
enslaved by the Nazis. 99
As is evident by its decision to reverse, the court ultimately found
Germany's arguments to be more persuasive. It noted that while no other
decision addressed Mr. Princz's specific argument that "a violation ofjus
cogens norms forfeits immunity under the implied waiver provision of
the FSIA," the Ninth Circuit had stated broadly that "' [t]he fact that there
has been a violation ofjus cogens does not confer jurisdiction under the
FSIA.""' The court then rejected Mr. Princz's jus cogens argument
as being "incompatible with the intentionality requirement implicit" in
the FSIA's implied waiver exception---the application of which,
according to the court, was dependent "upon [a] foreign government's

96. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 998 F,2d I (D.C. Cir. 1993).
97. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 923 (1995).
98. Id. at 1170-71, 1173. In support of the first argument, Mr. Princz relied on the FSIA's
waiver exception which denies sovereign immunity in a case "in which the foreign state has waived
its immunity either explicitly or by implication." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1994). Mr. Prinez also
argued that the district court was entitled to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the case through
either the FSIA's commercial activity exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994), or the FSIA's treaty
provision. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. The reasoning behind the court's rejection of these arguments is sound.
As such, neither exception will be the subject of analysis in this Comment. See supra note 25.
99. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1169.
100. Id. at 1174 (quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 719 (9th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1812 (1993)).
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having at some point indicated its amenability to suit."' 1 ' Still, the real
reasoning behind the court's rejection of the jus cogens argument--disingenuously buried in a footnote to the opinion-appears to
have been its reluctance to set a precedent which would open U.S. courts
to the proverbial flood of litigation.0 2
Finally, in regard to Mr. Princz's retroactivity argument, the court
noted that while there was a strong case to be made for applying the
FSIA retroactively,0 3 it need not decide whether to do so, for it found
that if the FSIA applied, the case fell within none of the Act's exceptions."° Conversely, if the FSIA did not apply, the district court would
still lack subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Princz's case. 0 5 Before
the FSIA was enacted, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 would have allowed the district
court to obtain jurisdiction over Germany.0 6 After the enactment of the
FSIA, however, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 effectively replaced section 1332.107
Under section 1330, jurisdiction over a foreign state can only be obtained
upon a finding that a claimant's case presents facts sufficient to bring it
within one of the FSIA's enumerated exceptions to sovereign immunity
which, according to the court, Mr. Princz's case did not do. 8

C. Judge Wald' Dissenting Opinion
Unlike her D.C. Circuit colleagues, Judge Patricia Wald agreed with
Mr. Princz's arguments.' 9 After an extensive discussion ofjus cogens

101. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174. In this context, the court noted the general reluctance of courts
to expand upon the examples of implied waiver in the FSIA's legislative history. Id. For a listing
of these examples, see supra text accompanying note 48.
102. See Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174-75 n.l. The court reasoned:
We think that something more nearly express is wanted before we impute to the Congress
an intention that the federal courts assume jurisdiction over the countless human rights
cases that might well be brought by the victims of all the ruthless military juntas,
presidents-for-life, and murderous dictators of the world, from Idi Amin to Mao Zedong.
Such an expansive reading of § 1605(a)(1) would likely place an enormous strain not

only upon our courts but, more to the immediate point, upon our country's diplomatic
relations with any number of foreign nations.

Id.
103. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994); see also infra part V.A.
104. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1170.

105. Id. at 1176.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. The court further noted that the case would not fall "within the federal question
jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because Mr. Prinez's claims against Germany sound in
tort and quasi contract, not in federal law." Id.
109. See id. at 1176-85 (Wald,J.,
dissenting).
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norms and their place in international law,"1 Judge Wald concluded
that "[n]othing in the legislative history of [the FSIA's waiver of

immunity exception] forecloses a finding that a state implicitly waives
immunity when it transgresses one of the few universally accepted norms

known as jus cogens."'1' Whereas the majority opinion found Mr.
Princz's jus cogens argument to be foreclosed by the intentionality
requirement of the FSIA's waiver exception,"' Judge Wald argued that

"[i]n inflicting theretofore unimaginable atrocities on innocent civilians
during the Holocaust, Germany could not have helped but realize that it
might one day be held accountable' 13for its heinous actions by any other
state, including the United States."
Judge Wald also endorsed the argument for applying the FSIA
retroactively." 4 Noting that the text and legislative history of the FSIA
provided scant guidance on the retroactivity issue," 5 Judge Wald
applied the teaching of the Supreme Court's decision in Landgrafv. USI
Film Products l6 and found that as "the FSIA infringes upon no rights
held by Germany at the time it enslaved and imprisoned Princz, it applies
[retroactively] to [Mr. Princz's] case.' 117 Finally, Judge Wald noted
that, in light of the strong support for Mr. Princz's cause expressed by
both the executive and legislative branches of government,118 an
exercise of jurisdiction over Germany by the district court for claims of

110. Id. at 1179-83. Judge Wald drew particular attention to thejus cogens norms condemning

slavery and genocide. See supra text accompanying note 84.
111. Princz,26F.3dat1184.
112. See supra text accompanying note 101.
113. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1184. According to Judge Wald, "[t]he magnitude of the acts put the
perpetrators on notice that they were violating 'principles common to the major legal systems of the
world."' Id. (quoting Report to the Presidentfrom Robert H.Jackson, Chief Counselfor the United
States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, reprintedin 39 AM. J.INT'L L. 178, 186 (1945)).

114. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1178.
115. Id.

116. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994). For a complete discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 124-33.
117. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1179.
118. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations tried unsuccessfully to intercede on Mr. Princz's
behalf through the usual diplomatic channels. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp.
22, 24 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 923 (1995).
Indeed, President Clinton raised the issue with Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl during a January
31, 1994 meeting, but Kohl reportedly declined to discuss Mr. Princz's case while it was still
pending. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1177.
Finally, both the Senate and the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed resolutions
imploring the executive branch to take steps to ensure that Mr. Prinez's claims are resolved and that
he be provided with fair reparations. S. Res. 162, 103rd Cong., Ist
Sess. (1993) (enacted); H.R. Res.
323, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (enacted).
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genocide and slavery would not disturb the "traditional comity concerns"
underlying the FSIA." 9
V. RETROACTIVITY AND IMPLIED WAIVER
A.

The Argument for Applying the FSIA Retroactively

Neither the D.C. Circuit nor the Supreme Court has ever decided
whether the FSIA applies retroactively to cover events which took place
before the United States adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity in 1952.12' As has been previously stated, however, courts
which have considered the issue have steadfastly refused to give the
FSIA retroactive application.12 Although they found various reasons
for so doing,' the crux of these courts' decisions was that applying
the FSIA to pre-1952 events would disturb a foreign state's "right" to
absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, as the law then
stood." The Supreme Court's recent decision in Landgrafv. USI Film
Products24 suggests that these beliefs may have been mistaken.
In Landgraf,the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 creating a right to recover
compensatory and punitive damages for certain violations of Title VII,
and providing for trial by jury if such damages were claimed, applied to
a Title VII case pending on appeal when the statute was enacted.' 25 In
holding that they do not, 126 the Court weighed two competing canons
of statutory construction: (1) "'a court must "apply the law in effect at
the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest
injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the
contrary"';127 and, (2) "'[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law,' [and
thus] 'congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be

119. See Princz, 26 F.3d at 1184.
120. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1170. This remains true as the D.C. Circuit ultimately reached no

decision on the issue and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
(quoting
S. Ct. at

See supra text accompanying note 52.
See supra text accompanying note 52-53, 55-57.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994).
Id. at 1488.
Id.
Id. at 1488 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 1992)
Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974))); see also Landgraf, 114
1496.
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construed2 8 to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this
result."",1
During an extensive discussion of these two canons, the Court made
several findings pertinent to this Comment. First, "[a] statute does not
operate 'retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising
from conduct antedating the statute's enactment, . . or upsets expectations based in prior law."'129 Instead, the presumption against retroactiv-

ity arises from the manifest "unfairness of imposing new burdens on [the
private rights of] persons after the fact."'130 Second, "[a]pplication of a
new jurisdictional rule usually 'takes away no substantive right but
simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case."",13 ' Thus, in cases
where jurisdictional statutes are at issue, present law would normally
control because "jurisdictional statutes 'speak to the power of the court
rather than the rights or obligations of the parties. ', 132 Finally, because
procedural rules "regulate secondary rather than primary conduct," the
fact that the conduct giving rise to a suit antedates a new3 procedural rule
3
will not make application of the rule truly retroactive.
While it must be stressed that these findings constitute nothing more
than persuasive dicta,' 34 they provide a viable framework for giving
retroactive application to the FSIA. With the exceptions of the ambiguous "henceforth" language of section 1602 and Congress's decision to
postpone the effective date of the FSIA until ninety days after its
enactment, 35 neither the text of the FSIA itself nor its legislative
128. Landgraf, 114 S.Ct. at 1496 (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,
208 (1988)); see also supra text accompanying note 53.
129. Landgraf, 114 S.Ct. at 1499 (citing Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami v. United States, 113
S. Ct. 554, 556-57 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
130. Landgraf 114 S.Ct. at 1500.
131. Id. at 1502 (quoting Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508-09 (1916)).
132. Landgraf, 114 S.Ct. at 1502 (quoting Republic Nat'l Bank of Miami, 113 S.Ct. at 565
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
133. Landgraf, 114 S.Ct. at 1502. The Court noted that it has regularly applied new
jurisdictional statutes "whether or not jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or when
the suit was filed." Id. at 1501.
134. Retroactive application ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1991 would have affected the substantive
rights of the defendant, who would not have been liable for either punitive or compensatory damages
under the old law. See id. at 1493.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56. As even the majority in Mr. Princz's case
conceded, the "henceforth" language of § 1602 could be read as suggesting that the FSIA applies
to all cases decided after its enactment, regardless of when the events giving rise to the case
occurred. Prinez v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S.Ct. 923 (1995) ("Unless one is to infer that the Congress intentionally but silently denied a
federal forum for all suits against a foreign sovereign... based upon pre-FSIA facts, the implication
is strong that all questions of foreign sovereign immunity... are to be decided under the FSIA.").
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history provide much guidance on the retroactivity issue.'3 6 In such a
case, Landgrafteaches that a court must determine whether the statute
"would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's
liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed"--i.e., whether the statute's application to events
predating its enactment would be truly retroactive."'
The immunity of a foreign state from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
was never considered to be a right per se, but rather, a matter of comity
and grace.'3 8 Any "right" to sovereign immunity that a foreign state
possessed under pre-FSIA law was, in reality, nothing more than an
expectation. As such, Landgrafdictates that application of the FSIA to
events preceding its enactment would not be truly retroactive.' 39 That
the FSIA is a jurisdictional statute 4 ' only serves to reinforce this
4l
proposition.'
One seemingly valid argument for denying retroactive application
to the FSIA, however, is Congress's pronouncement that the FSIA is not
intended to affect "the substantive law of liability."' 4' While this is
certainly true, courts have often placed far more reliance on this
statement than is deserved. 43 For to deny retroactive application of the
FSIA on this theory is, in a very real sense, putting the cart before the
horse. As an example, consider the case of a United States citizen whose
property is alleged to have been expropriated by a foreign state in
violation of international law.'" Suppose that, in defense of an action
against it brought by the citizen in a U.S. court, the foreign state claims
the protection of the act of state doctrine, 45 which prohibits U.S. courts

136. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1178 (Wald, J., dissenting).
137. Landgraf 114 S. Ct. at 1505.
138. See supra text accompanying note 34.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30. In the instant case, Judge Wald noted that
Germany "would suffer no inequity" from applying the FSIA retroactively, while denying such
application would be "manifestly unjust to [Mr.] Princz," as it would deny him his last chance at
reparation. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1179 (Wald, J., dissenting).
140. See supra note 43.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.
142. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6610.
143. See, e.g., Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1497-99 (1Ith Cir. 1986),
cert. denied,480 U.S. 917 (1987) (holding that the FSIA could not be applied retroactively to cover
transactions predating its enactment where to do so would create a cause of action where none
previously existed).
144. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1812 (1993).
145. Id. at 707.
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from "examining the validity of a taking by a foreign state of property
within its own territory, or from sitting in judgment on other acts of a
governmental character done by a foreign state within its own territory
and applicable there.' 4 6 Before the court can decide the act of state
issue-i.e., determine whether the state is to be held substantively liable
for its conduct-it must first consider the threshold issue of whether it
has subject matter jurisdiction. 47 Returning to the matter at hand, it
appears that courts which have denied retroactive application to the FSIA
on affecting substantive liability grounds have really been passing on the
merits of the case in lieu of what should have been their focus-making
the jurisdictional determination. As such, this argument for denying
retroactive application of the FSIA must fail.
Moreover, whatever force this argument may have in other cases,14it8
has none under the facts of Princz v. FederalRepublic of Germany.
The Nuremberg Trials, in which the United States participated, destroyed
for all time any notion Germany may have entertained that it could
escape liability for the atrocities it committed during World War H.
Additionally, in Bernstein v. N. V Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche
Stoomvarrt-Maatschappi,150 it was noted that, following a State
Department release expressly stating such, it had become the policy of
the Executive branch to relieve U.S. courts from placing any restraint
upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to question the validity of acts
committed by Germany during the war."
Thus, if from the Supreme Court's teaching in Landgraf,one is to
infer that a jurisdictional statute such as the FSIA should be applied to
events predating its enactment, the unique facts of the Princz case present
a stronger argument for so doing.

146. RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 443. The act of state doctrine "reflects the prudential
concern that the courts, if they question the validity of sovereign acts taken by foreign states, may
be interfering with the conduct of American foreign policy by the Executive and Congress."
Siderman, 965 F.2d at 707.
147. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 706. "The act of state doctrine is a principle or rule of decision that
the courts apply in deciding cases within theirjurisdiction."Id at 707 (emphasis added).
148. 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 923 (1995).

149. See generally The Numberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946); Steven Fogelson, Note, The
Nuremberg Legacy: An Unfulfilled Promise, 63 S.CAL. L. REV. 833 (1990).
150. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
151. Id.
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B.

Jus Cogens Violations as a Basisfor Implied
Waiver of FSIA Immunity

In Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 52 a court considered for the first time what, if any, impact a foreign state's violations of
jus cogens norms of international law would have on its claim of
sovereign immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts under the
FSIA.'53 The Siderman family claimed that on March 24, 1976,
following a coup d'etat by the Argentine military, ten armed and masked
men forcibly entered their home in Argentina's Tucuman Province and
abducted Jose Siderman.IM Mr. Siderman was tortured for seven days
at an unknown location with, among other things, an electric
cattle
56
prod. 55 His only "crime" appeared to be that he was Jewish.
Following Mr. Siderman's release, the Siderman family fled
Argentina for fear that they would be killed and joined their daughter,
Susana, in the United States. 57 The Argentine government, however,
continued its persecution of the Sidermans, initiating a criminal action
against Jose and seizing the Sidermans' family owned business. 58 In
1982, after obtaining permanent United States resident status, the
Sidermans finally looked to the federal courts for relief by filing suit
against the Argentine government for the torture of Jose, and the
expropriation of the Siderman's property by Argentine military officials.'59 The district court initially dismissed the expropriation claim
and awarded a default judgment on the torture claim for $2.6 million.' 6 After Argentina challenged the damages award, however, the
district court vacated the default judgment and dismissed the Sidermans'
claim entirely, holding that Argentina was entitled to sovereign immunity
under the FSIA. 6 ' The Sidermans promptly filed a notice of appeal.' 62
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that the Sidermans'

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1812 (1993).
Id. at 714-19.
Id. at 703.
Id.
Id. During Mr. Siderman's torture, his captors allegedly "shouted anti-Sermitic epithets." Id.
Id.
Id. at 703-04.
Id. at 704.

160. Id.
161.

Id.

162. Id. at 705.
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expropriation claim alleged facts sufficient to bring it within both 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), the FSIA's commercial activity exception, and 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3), the FSIA's international takings exception.'63 With
regard to the torture claim, the court considered three arguments raised
by the Sidermans for denying Argentina the protection of sovereign
immunity: (1) that Argentina is precluded from asserting sovereign
immunity by its violation ofjus cogens norms of international law which
prohibit official torture; (2) that the claim falls within the FSIA's existing
treaty exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1604; and (3) that the claim falls within the
FSIA's implied waiver exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). 1"
Ultimately, the court rejected the first two of these arguments but
accepted the third. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,65 it found both that the
FSIA's treaty exception only applies where a claimant can "identify an
international agreement to which the United States is a party which
'expressly conflict[s] with the immunity provisions of the FSIA,"' and
that the Sidermans had failed to do so.'6 As to the jus cogens argument, the court concluded that while there arejus cogens norms against
official torture, 67 the FSIA contains no express exceptions to sovereign
immunity for a state which violates such norms, and if such exceptions
are to be made, the task of doing so lies with Congress, not the
courts. 68 Finally, however, as Argentina had availed itself of U.S.
courts in its continued persecution of the Sidermans, the court found that
by so doing it had implicitly waived its sovereign immunity within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1), thereby conferring
the jurisdiction
169
necessary to hear the Sidermans' torture claim.
Because the Sidermans presented all of their arguments separately,
the Ninth Circuit had no opportunity to assess the validity of the more
specific argument considered by the D.C. Circuit in the Princz case, i.e.,
that the FSIA does indeed contain an exception for a foreign state's
violation of jus cogens norms--the implied waiver exception. 7 The

163. id. at 712.
164. Id. at 714-20.
165. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
166. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 720 (alteration in original) (quoting Hess, 488 U.S. at 442).
167. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 717.
168. Id. at 719.
169. Id. at 722.
170. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd, 26 F.3d
1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995). The theory proposing that the FSIA's
implied waiver exception applies to a foreign state's violation ofjus cogen norms was first proposed
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D.C. Circuit, of course, rejected this contention and,17' in so doing,
raised the traditional arguments against giving the implied waiver
exception too broad a construction. The court first noted that to construe
the implied waiver exception to include violations ofjus cogens norms
would be incompatible with the "intentionality" requirement which courts
have found to be implicit in the exception. 7 2 It then pointed to the fact
that the courts have been reluctant to stray beyond the examples of
implied waiver listed in the FSIA's legislative history, and declined to do
so itself.' These are certainly valid arguments, but had the court been
as diligent in applying the arguments to the facts of the case as it was in
citing authority in support of them, it could not have helped but realize
that neither was applicable here.
The solitary piece of evidence which the court cites in support of
its intentionality argument is that neither "the present government of
Germany [nor] the predecessor government of the Third Reich actually
indicated ... a willingness to waive immunity for actions arising out of
the Nazi atrocities."'7 4 Yet nothing in the language of the FSIA itself
would seem to indicate that a foreign state must first have "intended" to
be held accountable for its actions in U.S. courts before an implied
waiver of immunity will be found. Instead, the intentionality requirement
is a judicially created limitation. 7 ' Be that as it may, however, by
systematically enslaving and murdering millions of Jews during World
War II, Germany violated, among others, recognized jus cogens norms
of international law against both genocide and slavery.'7 6 Given the
magnitude of the atrocities committed, one would be hard pressed to
argue that Germany had no expectation that it would be called upon to
answer for them in the event that it lost the war.' Moreover, when

in a 1989 comment written by three students attending the Boalt Hall School of Law in Berkeley,
Califomia. See Belsky et al., supra note 31.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
172. See supra text accompanying note 101.
173. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert.denied,
115 S. Ct. 923 (1995).
174, Id.
175. Id. at 1184 (Wald, J., dissenting).
176. See supra text accompanying note 84.
177. Fogelson noted that Colonel Telford Taylor, who was involved in the prosecution of the
Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg, argued that "[t]he possibility of punishment should have been so
apparent to the criminals that no one, except a strict formalist, could seriously raise the issue of ex
post facto punishment." Fogelson, supra note 149, at 844 (citing BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE
AMERICAN

ROAD

TO

NUREMBuRG 211 (1982)); see also Princz, 26 F.3d at 1184 (Wald, J.,

dissenting) ("Germany could not have helped but realize that it might one day be held accountable
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Germany was called upon to answer for its crimes, at the Nuremberg
trials, the legitimacy of the prosecutions rested not on its consent,
implied or otherwise, to be held accountable, but rather on the nature of
the acts committed-acts "violat[ing] the criminal law of all civilized
countries in the world."' 178 Stated differently, acts of a state which are
"'contrary to international law are invalid and cannot become a source
of legal rights for the wrongdoer."" 7 9 Such acts lose their character as
sovereign acts-for which Congress expressly intended to retain
immunity when it enacted the FSIA' 8 0 -and are therefore not entitled
to a claim of immunity. 18' Thus, both the historical background underlying the Princz case, and the consequences of a foreign state's
derogation from jus cogens norms, seem to negate the intentionality
requirement argument for declining to expand the scope of the FSIA's
implied waiver exception to include an implied waiver for jus cogens
violations.
In light of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Siderman,' the D.C.
Circuit's reliance on judicial reluctance to expand the examples of
implied waiver in the FSIA's legislative history likewise proves to be a
negligible basis for its holding. As Judge Wald noted, the "list is neither
exclusive nor exhaustive,.. . and courts are by no means constrained to
these . . . examples of implied waiver."' 3 Indeed, in Siderman, the
Ninth Circuit apparently did not feel so constrained. Its finding that
Argentina impliedly waived its claim of sovereign immunity by availing
itself of U.S. courts in pursuit of the Siderman family"s was certainly
not culled from among the examples listed in the FSIA's legislative
history. In truth, the D.C. Circuit's "real" reasoning behind its rejection
of thejus cogens argument provides the only sound basis for its decision.
Any finding that a foreign state impliedly waives its claim of
sovereign immunity when it violates jus cogens norms of international

for its heinous actions by any other state, including the United States.").
178. See Fogelson, supra note 149, at 866.
179. See Belsky et al., supra note 31, at 401 (quoting HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 420 (1947)).
180. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6605 ("[T]he immunity of a foreign state is 'restricted' to suits involving a foreign state's
public acts (jure imperii) and does not extend to suits based on its commercial or private acts (jure
gestionis).").
181. See Belsky et al.,supra note 31, at 401.
182. See supra text accompanying note 169.
183. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 923 (1995).
184. See supra text accompanying note 169.
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law necessarily carries with it the possibility of. (1) courts interfering
with the foreign policy determinations of the Executive and Legislative
Branches of government; and (2) setting a precedent which has the
potential to open U.S. courts to a flood of litigation.'85 With both the
Executive and Legislative Branches voicing their support for Mr. Princz's
cause,s 6 the first of these dangers was not present in Princz. However,
the danger of opening U.S. courts to the proverbial flood of litigation
was present, and, as such, must ultimately be regarded as the impetus for
the D.C. Circuit's decision. In the final analysis then, a rule which seeks
to expand the FSIA's implied waiver exception to include a jus cogens
violation must be very narrowly construed if it is to avoid the flood of
litigation danger-something which, for all of its other merits, Judge
Wald's dissenting opinion failed to take into account. 8 7
Relevant considerations for a court facing this issue in the future
might include: (1) the citizenship of the claimant (e.g., a requirement that
the claimant be an American citizen); (2) support for the claimant's cause
in the government's political branches; (3) the availability (or lack
thereof) of an alternative forum in which the claimant may present his
claims; and (4) the severity of thejus cogens violations alleged (possibly
allowing only the claimant that has alleged one of a core group ofjus
cogens violations---e.g., genocide, slavery, official torture--the opportunity to present his claim). Finally, to ensure that the court has a
legitimate interest in adjudicating the claim, there must exist a requirement-similar to that contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)18 -- that the
conduct alleged has a direct effect in the United States
VI.

CONCLUSION

Hugo Princz's fifty year struggle at long last came to an end when,
on September 19, 1995, he and ten other U.S. citizens settled with
Germany for more than $2 million in reparations. 8 9 In Mr. Princz's
own words, "[t]he settlement ... can never bring [his] parents, [his]
siblings back, nor relieve [his] nightmares of the death camps or the

185. See Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174 n.1; see also supra note 102 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
187. Judge Wald instead opted for a broader rule under which a foreign state's violation ofjus
cogens norms was a per se implied waiver of sovereign immunity. See Princz,26 F.3d at 1184-85.
188. The FSIA's commercial activity exception, requires that "an act outside the territory of the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere... causes a
direct effect in the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
189. WW1 Reparations to 11 U.S. Citizens, NEWSDAY, Sept. 20, 1995, at A16.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

25

Hofstra
Law Review,
Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1995], Art.
1124:515
HOFSTRA
LAW REVIEW
[Vol.

physical pain [he] suffer[s] ... [b]ut it will finally help correct a terrible
injustice."' 19 While Mr. Princz's long overdue triumph is certainly a
cause for celebration, supporters of human rights should temper their
revelry with a degree of caution. For as laudable as the settlement is, it
is likely to have little, if any, effect on the judiciary's draconian
construction of the FSIA's implied waiver provision. There will be other
Hugo Princzs in the future and it does not stretch reason to postulate that
their persecutors will not be as agreeable to a settlement as was
Germany. Where such is the case, victims of human rights abuses should
be able to turn to the courts. Yet rigid decisions such as the D.C.
Circuit's ordain that such avenues of redress remain closed, sacrificing
justice for the sake of a less burdensome caseload. In the long run, if the
United States wishes to continue to hold itself to the world as a
champion of human rights, it should, indeed must, provide a forum to
which victims of human rights abuses can present their claims. Such a
forum will only be made available through a reform of the current law
on sovereign immunity. Whether this is done through the courts themselves or through Congress, the time to act is now.
Michael W Hoops

190. Id.
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